This paper deals with the relation between commercial policy and "the" equilibrium real exchange rate. The paper clarifies the meaning of real exchange rate by comparing five different definitions that are currently found in the literature. The analysis focuses on the effects of an economic liberalization program that reduces import tariffs on the equilibrium real exchange rate under a number of alternative assumptions regarding capital mobility. From a policy perspective this is an important issue, since countries that embark on liberalization are usually concerned with avoiding real exchange rate misalignment and overvaluation. The effects of terms of trade shocks on the equilibrium real exchange rate are also investigated.
I. Introduction
Carlos Diaz-Alejandro's interests were remarkably broad; they ranged from the economic history of Latin America, to the functioning of international financial markets, to the technology of cement plants) There were, however, two interrelated topics to which Diaz Alejandro kept coming back time after time: the role of international trade in the development process, and the importance of exchange rate policies. He first addressed the exchange rate problem in his 1961 MIT dissertation, later published as Exchange Rate Devaluation in a Semi-Industrialized Country: The Experience of Argentina. 1955 -1961 (MIT Press, 1966 . In this work, which has become a classic on the subject, Diaz-Alejandro developed a number of important insights including the by-now popular idea that under certain circumstances devaluations can be contractionary.2 In his later work, Diaz-Alejandro came back to the exchange rate issue with renewed interest; he was particularly concerned with understanding the behavior of real exchange rates in the developing countries.
Possibly, Diaz-Alejandro's most prominent work on the role of trade policy in the development process is contained in his monumental volume on the economic history of Argentina. In it he forcefully argued that during the post-World War II period Argentina had neglected the potential role of international trade as an engine of growth. The importance of international trade in the development process is also a dominant aspect of Diaz Alejandro's work on the Colombian economy. Throughout his work on the relation between trade and growth Diaz-Alejandro emphasized that maintaining an "appropriate" exchange rate policy was essential for the success of trade liberalization reforms aimed at moving a country towards an export-oriented development strategy. The maintenance of the real exchange rate at its "appropriate" (or realistic) level should be interpreted as meaning that the actual value of the real exchange rate should not depart significantly from its equilibrium value. In other words, in this Diaz-Alejandro context, an "appropriate" real exchange rate is one that does not become misaligned, and especially overvalued (Diaz-Alejandro, 1984) .
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the way in which the adoption of an export oriented policy through the liberalization of the external sector affects the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate. Surprisingly perhaps, in spite of the increasing importance of issues related to trade liberalization, much of the policy discussion on the relation between commercial policies, liberalization, and real exchange rate has been quite confusing.4 This paper seeks to clarify and integrate some of the issues involved by formally developing two simple general equilibrium models to investigate the relation between changes in commercial policies and the real exchange rate.
II. The Traditional Literature
In the economic development policy literature on tariffs, liberalization and development strategies it has long been recognized that there is a relation between tariffs level and the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate. Most of this discussion, however, has been quite vague and has been carried out in a partial equilibrium context. The vagueness in this policy literature has stemmed in part from the confusion that for some time now has surrounded the concept of "the" real exchange rate. In fact, as discussed in more detail below, there are a number of competing definitions for "the" real exchange rate, and many times one is not sure which concept a particular author has in mind.
The traditionally accepted view among policymakers has been that a reduction in tariffs in a small country will always "require" a real (equilibrium) depreciation to maintain external balance. The argument usually given is based on a partial equilibrium interpretation of the elasticities approach to exchange rate determination, and runs along the following lines: a lower tariff will reduce the domestic prióe of importables, and consequently increase the demand for imports. This, in turn, will generate an external imbalance (i.e., a trade account deficit), which assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, will require a (real) devaluation to restore equilibrium. This view is clearly captured by the following quote from Balassa (1982, P. 16) : "[E]liminating protective measures would necessitate a devaluation in order to offset the resulting deficit in the balance of payments". On the other hand, according to Harry Johnson (1969, p. 159) :
One of the assumptions commonly made in the context of liberalization of trade by underdeveloped countries is that such liberalization would necessarily involve a balance of payments deficit and the consequent necessity of devaluation....
The proposition that a reduction (or elimination) of tariffs will necessarily result in an equilibrium real depreciation has also been made in the shadow pricing literature. Some authOrs have proposed that the shadow exchange rate should be computed as the equilibrium real exchange rate under conditions of free trade (Bacha and Taylor 1971) . It has then been postulated that an elimination of existing trade impediments will result in a higher equilibrium real exchange rate (i.e., in a real depreciation). For example, for the case of a small country which faces initial trade equilibrium, Bacha and Taylor (1971, p. 216) proposed the following expression for the free trade real exchange rate: eF e(l+t), (1) where eF is the free trade equilibrium (real) exchange rate, e is the existing equilibrium (real) exchange rate prior to the elimination of tariffs, t is the level of the tariffs and -y for elasticity of demand of level of demand for imports and elasticity of supply for exports.
More recently using a slightly different model, Taylor (1979, p. 207) has insisted on this point (where the same notation applies):5
[S]uppose that a preexisting tariff is reduced or removed [N]aturally, e/eF' is less than 1....
A common feature of most early models is that they ignored, among other things, the presence of intermediate inputs. This problem was acknowledged by Harry Johnson (1969) in an article that uses effective rates of protection to analyze the effect of tariff changes on the equilibrium exchange rate (see also Corden 1971, Ch. 5 ). Johnson pointed out that once intermediate goods were allowed into the picture the reduction or removal of tariffs could result either in a devaluation or in an atpreciation. In Johnson's words (1969, p. 159) : "[T]ariffs structures may bring about a situation in which appreciation rather than depreciation would be necessary to preserve equilibrium under liberalization. . ." The reason for this is intuitively clear. With intermediate goods it is possible that some activities will have a negative effective rate of protection; that is the tariff structure will impose a tax on value-added in those activities.
Consequently, the removal of tariffs will reduce the magnitude of this tax and, according to Johnson's model, will result in higher production of these goods. The effects of eliminating the negative rates of effective protection could be such that a balance of payments surplus could result, with the consequent required appreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate (see also Corden 1971) .6
Most traditional treatments of the relationship between commercial policy and the real exchange rate have also tended to (implicitly or explicitly) ignore the presence of nontradable goods.7 However, once nontradables are allowed into the picture the effect of tariff changes on the real exchange rate can be different from those obtained from simpler partial equilibrium models (Edwards, 1987) . In Section III and IV of this paper two alternative models with nontradables are used to formally analyze the relation between tariff liberalization and the equilibrium real exchange rate. It is shown that although in principle, within the context of a general equilibrium framework, a commodity trade liberalization can result in either equilibrium real depreciation or appreciation, the real depreciation case is somewhat more plausible.
III. Tariffs and the Real Exchange Rate in a Factor-Specific Model
In this section the relation between tariff liberalization policies and the equilibrium real exchange rate in a model with sectoral factor specificity is presented. An important property of this model is that changes in the demand for nontradables play a predominant role in determining the new equilibrium real exchange rate. This contrasts with the more standard model of Section IV where the behavior of the real exchange rate is independent of the demand for nontradables. As is pointed out below the model in this section can be interpreted as capturing the short or medium run effects of the tariff reform.
Since much of the confusion found in the policy literature on the will be the relative price of consumption or production baskets More recently, however, most authors have defined the real exchange rate in the context of dependent economy-type models, as the relative price of tradable to nontradable goods (see, for example, Dornbusch 1974 , Krueger 1978 , Mussa 1984 , Frenkel and Mussa 1984 . Assuming that the law of one price holds for tradables and that there are no taxes on trade, the real exchange rate is defined by these authors as: e = EP/PN, where is the world price of tradables, and is the domestic price of nontradables.
It is interesting to compare the tradables-nontradables relative price definition with the PPP definition of the real exchange rate. Assuming that P and P* in the PPP definition are geometrically weighted averages of tradable and nontradable prices, with weights, a, (1-a), 8 and (l-8),
it is possible to write P and P* -PP1. Further assuming that the country in question is small, that the law of one price holds for tradable goods (i.e., T -PE), and that E is fixed and equal to 1, it is possible to find the relation between percentage changes in the real exchange rate (e) and in the PPP real exchange rate (where, as usual, the "hat" operator (") represents percentage change:
= (l/a) + (/a)(P-P).
It may be seen that in general changes in the two definitions of the real exchange rate will differ (i.e., ,). Moreover, e and can even move in opposite directions, depending on the behavior of foreign relative prices
The above discussion has ignored taxes on international trade.
However, if there are these type of taxes a decision should be made on whether to define a real exchange rate inclusive or.exclusive of them. If it is assumed that tradables are subject to a uniform protective tax of rate t, an index that takes into account the effect of protection on competitiveness can be defined as eT -e(l+t). Obviously, if the tax on tradables does not change, eT and e will move at the same rate:
=
In fact, most theoretical analyses rooted in the dependent economy model have chosen to use eT as "the" real exchange rate. However, a limitation of this definition, is that it assumes that all tradable goods are subject to the same tax. In a many goods economy, the different tradable goods are subject to taxes at different rates. For example, most importables are subject to differentiated tariffs or import quotas, while some exportables are many times subject to taxes. For this reason, in applied work, it has been proposed to define sector-specific (or goodspecific) indexes of the real exchange rate corrected by the effects of 11 . taxes (or subsidies).
For example, if sector j is subject to a tax of t. (2) and (3) implies that this economy is also in external balance. Equation (4) specifies that in this economy importables are subject to a (specific) tariff r. P in equation (5) is an index of the general price level, whereas T in (6) is an index of the price of tradables.
The equilibrium real exchange rate is defined (for any of the five RER concepts discussed above) as that value of the RER for which internal and external equilibrium hold simultaneously, given (long term sustainable) values of other exogenous variables such as tariffs, international terms of trade, technology, and preferences.15 According to equations (2) and (3), then, this economy is initially in internal and external equilibrium, and the initial real exchange rate is at its equilibrium level. Then, in this context, changes in the RER induced by exogenous shock should be interpreted as a change in the equilibrium real exchange rate.16
The modelling strategy is to first analyze how changes in the tariff will affect the equilibrium relative price of N and then look at how the five different definitions of equilibrium real exchange rate are affected.
Totally differentiating (2) and (3) and using (4) we find that 
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The sign of dpN/dr in (7) In general, under most circumstances it can be expected that unless the initial distortion is very high, (i.e., the initial r is very large), the substitution effect will dominate. Consequently, although we have seen that rigorously (dpN/dr) cannot be signed, under most plausible assumptions -that is, when all goods are gross substitutes and the substitution effect dominate --we have the (dpN/dr) > 0.
Having found (dpN/dr) in (7), all we require are straightforward arithmetic manipulations to find how the alternative definitions of equilibrium real exchange rates react to a tariff liberalization policy. Table 1 summarizes the results obtained in the more general case, where the expression for (dpN/dr) is given by (7). From this table it is clear that in general, for many of these definitions, it is not possible to know a priori how the equilibrium real exchange rate will change following a The results in equation (7) of Table 1 were derived assuming that tariffs on all importables were reduced by the same amount. In reality, however, liberalization reforms seldom work that way. In most instances only some tariffs are reduced. If only tariffs on a subset k of importables are reduced while for the m other importables tariffs are maintained, we have that dpN
Of course, since E , R > 0 additional sources kM kM N kM kM < of sign ambiguity emerge for d /drk.
Extensions

Wage Rigidity
The previous discussion has been carried out under the assumption of fully flexible factor and commodity prices. This, however, may not be the 
where R is the partial derivative of the constrained revenue function (9) with respect to the price of nontradables. Neary (1985) has shown that under fix factor prices the following relation exists between restricted and unrestricted revenue functions:
where L is the amount of labor employed in the constrained case.
It is easy to find how the relative price of nontradables reacts to a tariff reduction in an economy with factor spe'cificity and fix real wages)9
In order to facilitate the comparison with the case of flexible factor prices dpN/dr is expressed in terms of the derivatives of the unconstrained revenue function:
Since it.
, it. > 0 and it < 0 it follows that , > . Also the LPM LPN LL inspection of (12), (13) and (7) reveals that, dN dpN (14) That is, under wage rigidity the equilibrium relative price of nontradables will be less responsive to changes in tariffs. This means that under these circumstances it is not sufficient that the substitution effect dominates in order for a tariff liberalization to result in a decline of the relative price of nontradables. Moreover, it is now possible to have a number of pseudo-paradoxes where changes in tariff levels can result in a real depreciation with wage flexibility, but in a real appreciation under wage rigidity.
Import Quotas
The case import quotas can be analyzed in a quite straightforward fashion by defining "virtual prices" as in Neary and Roberts (1980) . The use of virtual prices, of course, assumes that the quota is allocated competitively via an auction mechanism. In this case the relaxation of a binding import quota will result in a lower virtual price for importables, which can be analyzed in a way perfectly analogous to our previous discussion. Obviously, the reason why our tariff discussion can be directly applied to the case of quotas is that under the assumptions made here there is an equivalence between tariffs and quotas.
Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods can also be incorporated quite easily through the definition of net-outputs (Dixit and Norman 1980, p. 160) . In this case an additional source of ambiguity with respect to the sign of dpN/dr emerges.
The reason, of course, is related to Johnson's (1969) (1982, pp. 32-33) have argued that whereas a tariff reduction will lead to a real depreciation (i.e., dpN/dr > O for the e definition of RER), an improvement in the terms of trade will result in a real appreciation (i.e., dpN/dp <0). It is clear from equation (15) 
It is interesting to interpret a transfer from abroad as capital inflows resulting from a relaxation of capital controls in a small country.
This means that if, as was the case in the recent Southern Cone liberalizations, following the opening of the capital account foreign funds flow into the country (dH > 0), the relative price of nontradables will increase, generating a real appreciation for every definition of the RER used here.
In fact Diaz Alejandro (1981) was one of the first observers who perceptively noticed the importance of this real appreciation in the frustrating Southern Cone experiments.
The (highly likely) possibility of dpN/dH and dpN/dr have the same sign is at the core of recent policy discussions on the appropriate order of economic liberalization in the developing countries (Edwards 1984 Edwards (1986c) . The results, in terms of the reaction of N' will under most circumstances be the same as those discussed here.22 An interesting application of the two period model is to investigate how expected changes in the tariff in the future will affect the path of Since in that setting, foreign borrowing is possible, consumers will try to smooth consumption and will increase their demand for nontradables both in periods 1 and 2. As a result in the first period there will be positive pressure on even though the tariff in that period will still be on. On the other hand, the expected reduction of r will affect the consumption rate of interest, and present consumption on all goods will tend to be reduced. The final outcome can be either a higher or lower in period 1. In Edwards (1986c), the case with foreign borrowing is analyzed in great detail, emphasizing the distinction between permanent and temporary changes in tariffs. However, in order to provide some idea on how this case with foreign borrowing works, in Appendix B the general model is presented.
IV. Trade Reform and the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate in the Mobile Factor Case
The discussion of the preceding section assumed that capital was fixed and that it could not move across sectors folowing a commodity relative price shock. The importance of that assumption lays on the fact that factor prices become independent of world commodity prices. As a result demand conditions for nontradables play a crucial role in determining the real exchange reaction to changes in r or p. In the present section the more traditional case with full intersectoral factor mobility is analyzed. To the extent that the fixed factors Ricardo-Viner model of Section III is considered a short-run model, the one in the present section can be viewed as a medium or intermediate run model.23 The comparison of both cases will give us some (rough) idea on the dynamics of the real exchange rate following a trade liberalization reform.
Consider the case of a small economy that, as before, produces exportables (X), importables (M) and nontradables (N), using two intersector mobile factors of production, capital (K) and labor (L). As before, it is assumed also that the worldwide common technology is charac- prices on production in the context of similar models see Corden and Neary (1982) , Edwards (l986a) , and Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1987) .
The model can be presented in traditional Jones (1965) notation by equations (17) and (18), where once again the price of X is taken as the numeraire. Note that, as long as there is no specialization there is no need to specify the demand side to find the effects of tariff changes on prices, factor rewards and the real exchange rate. However, to find its effect on output demand considerations are required. that as a consequence of the tariff reduction, the price of nontradables in terms of exportables has to decline. As a result the isocost for N will move down until it intersects the other two curves at B.
Straightforward manipulation of (17) and (18) gives us the formal expression for the change in N following a change in r: N I9KX0KN1
L( J where 9 ar/p; O 1 -9; 9 ar/pM; and 1 -O.
Since our capital intensity assumptions mean < < O, equation (19) implies that PN/T > 0.
It is interesting to notice that in the present case of full factor mobility the degree of ambiguity regarding is much reduced in relation to the model in Section III. For example, if the relative capital intensities are reversed to > > 9, we still get that > 0.
Only if it is assumed that nontradables are at an extreme of the capital intensity ranking (i.e., < < or < < we can get PN/r < 0. This, however is a rather implausible case for a developing country. Moreover, when nontradables are at one of the extremes of the relative capital labor ranking, it is more likely that we will have specialization in production; in that case of course the present framework has to be modified by explicitly bringing in the demand for nontradables. This, of course is the traditional result which indicates that a tariff By assuming nonspecialization, in the above discussion it has been possible to ignore the role of the demand for nontradables. However, it is possible that as a result of the relative price shock this country will specialize in the production of X and N, while consuming M, X and N.
Using the notation from Section III in this case we have:
MM MN
where as before L' > 0.
As in Section III the analysis presented here can be easily extended in several directions. With full intersectoral factor mobility, the existence of factor price rigidities is likely to lead to specialization in the nontradable and one of the tradables, as Brecher (1974) has shown.26 The case of quotas can also be analyzed using the "virtual prices" trick. The consequences of opening the capital account will, to a large extent, depend on whether as a consequence specialization in N and X will result. It is interesting to note that in this case if, as it is the most plausible case, > 0, then can never be positive.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper the effects of tariff changes on the eiuilibrium real exchange rate have been analyzed in some detail. It was indicated that according to the traditional policy literature in small countries a tariff reduction will necessarily lead to an equilibrium real depreciation, and that a terms of trade improvement will provoke an equilibrium real appreciation. It was then shown that these propositions are theoretically not strictly correct. More specifically, it was shown that within the 
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This means that the determinant in equation (7) is positive.
APPENDIX B
The Intertemporal Case
In this Appendix a two-period version of the model developed in the paper is presented. As before, superscripts refer to periods (i.e., R2 is the revenue function in period 2); subscripts refer to partial derivatives with respect to that variable (i.e., R11 is the partial derivative of period l's revenue function relative to q (the price of nontradables in period 1); R22 2 is the second derivative of with respect to q2 and 2 qp p ): (B.5)
where the following notation is used:
Specific tariffs in period i.
5*
World discount factor, equal to (l+r*), where r* is world real interest rates (in terms of tradables).
E( )
Intertemporal expenditure function.
ir '(l,p1,q1) Exact price indexes, which under assumptions of homothecity and separability, corresponds to unit expenditure functions.
(See Edwards and van Wijnbergen, 1986.) W Total aggregate welfare.
Equation (B.l) is the interteniporal budget constraint, and states that present value of income --generateti through revenues from production + 5*R2, plus tariffs collection --had to equal present value of expenditure.
Given the assumption of perfect access to the world capital market, the discount factor used in (B.1) is the world discount factor 6*. Equations The current account in period 1 is equal to the difference between income and total expenditure in that period:
From the inspection of equations (B.1)-(B.5) it is apparent that exogenous shocks in, say, the international terms of trade, will affect the vector of equilibrium RERs through two interrelated channels. The first one, which has been subject to some discussion in the literature, is related to intratemporal effects of terms of trade shocks on resource allocation and consumption decisions. For example, as a result of a temporary worsening of the terms of trade, there will be a tendency to produce more and consume less of M in that period. This, plus the income effect resulting from the worsening of the terms of trade will generate an incipient disequilibrium in the nontradables market which will have to be resolved by a change in the equilibrium q. In fact, if we assume that there is an absence of foreign borrowing these intratemporal effects will be the only relevant ones.
However, with capital mobility, as in the current model, there is a second intertemporal channel through which changes in exogenous variables will affect the vector of equilibrium RERs. For example, in the case of a temporary worsening of the terms of trade, the consumption discount factor will be affected, altering the intertemporal allocation of consumption. In the rest of the paper we will emphasize the role of this intertemporal effect.
of exportables to importables, and the real exchange rate is usually defined as the relative price of tradables to nontradables, there is no reason for them to be equivalent. In fact, there are circumstances where these two variables will tend to move in the opposite direction. Williamson (1983) has recently stressed the importance of distinguishing between the terms of trade arid the real exchange rate. Also Katseli (1984) has recently shown, using a cross-country data set, that these two variables have tended to behave quite differently in recent years.
11
See, for example Krueger (1978) .
12Recently, Harberger (1986) has proposed yet another definition for the real exchange rate: eH = E/P, where as before E is the nominal exchhange rate, and is a "general" domestic price level. In this case eH is the relative price of the domestic basket in terms of a unit of foreign currency. In terms of the discussion in this paper e is equivalent to e. For this reason we will not deal specifically with eH.
13For the purpose of the present paper a general definition that can be applied to any of the competing concepts of real exchange rate is provided.
The equilibrium real exchange rate is defined as that relative price which simultaneously equilibrates the external and internal sectors, for given long term equilibrium values of other key variables such as international terms of trade, capital inflows and commercial policies. These other variables are usually called the "fundamental" determinants of the equilibrium real exchange rate. "Internal equilibrium" implies that there is full employment. For discussions see, for example, Williamson (1983), Katseli (1984) and Edwards (1988) .
14The existence of more factors than goods assures that R is twice differentiable. 15Since in this model there is no foreign borrowing the equilibrium RER is defined in temporal terms. In models with foreign borrowing and lending the equilibrium RER is defined in intertemporal terms. For this type of intertemporal model see, for example, Edwards (l987b) and the section on extensions below.
161n this model it is assumed that the actual RER is always at its equilibrium level. In that sense, there is no RER misalignment. On equilibrium and disequilibrium RERs see, however, Edwards (l987a).
'7Of course the possibility of complementarity between any two goods arises because we have a three goods model.
18See Neary (1985) . See also Chapter 8 of Dixit and Norman (1980) .
Notice that in the analysis that follows it is assumed that throughout all three goods are produced. This is possible thanks to the assumption that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not hold. See Section IV below for further discussions on the subject.
19
.
. . An important point is whether real wages are actually fix, or if they are only inflexible downward.
20Edwards (1984) used transfers to analyze the behavior of the real exchange rate following a liberalization of the capital account.
the Southern Cone also see Diaz Alejandro (1981), Edwards (1985) , Corbo (1985) , Hanson and de Melo (1985) , and Calvo (1986) .
22The main difference will be that under that framework the funds obtained from abroad will also be used to increase the capital stock.
23The long run will be given by the case with capital accumulation and population growth.
24An important question that crucially impinges on the nature of the results that follow is whether it is reasonable to assume nonspecialization. Jones (1974) discusses the case of many commodity (one of them nontradable) and two factors and shows that the production possibilities frontier will be flat. Changes in world price of importables and exportables or in tariffs, however, will shift the position of the production possibilities frontier.
The case I focus on here corresponds to that depicted in Fig. 9 of Jones (1974) paper, where over a reasonable range the two tradables and the nontradable are produced. This, of course, requires thatthe aggregate capital-labor ratio net of capital and labor employed in the NT sector, falls between the capital-labor ratios in each traded sector that guarantee zero profits at positive activity levels for given world traded goods prices. Since these latter two ratios will in general be different, the set of equilibria characterized by incomplete specialization has positive measure. In Section IV.2 I discuss the case of specialization in nontradables and one of the tradables.
is assumed that there are no capital intensity reversals and that the capital intensities in value terms correspond to those in physical terms.
26Notice, however, that starting from nonspecialization rigid real wages will generate not additional problems. The reason of course is that under our assumptions of relative capital intensities the tariff removal will result in an increase in the real wage.
